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Abstract 
 
Renewed interest in theories and perspectives of embodiment has emerged in conjunction 
with advances in ubiquitous computing and the development of technologies that inherently 
change the character of human computer interaction. The very nature of technologies such as 
tangible, multi-touch, sensor and mobile technologies offers opportunities for exploiting a 
wider range of perceptual-based experiences than traditional desktop computing. Primarily 
they offer opportunities to exploit more bodily-based physical experiences in new ways, for 
example, through manipulation of physical objects linked to a variety of digitally 
augmentations; enhancing contextually based experience in real world environments through 
mobile devices, fostering new forms interaction and new ways of thinking. These 
developments are important in explaining the contemporary interest in concepts of 
embodiment, in the context of digital technologies that foster more embodied forms of 
interaction and experiences. However, notions of embodiment have a long and complex 
history, with continued debate from various disciplinary perspectives. This working paper 
provides a brief history of theoretical approaches to embodiment, an introduction to ways in 
which embodiment is described within different disciplines, and outlines key ways in which 
these perspectives are of interest in the current context of digital technology research. 
Introduction 
Over the past 20 years there has been a surge of interdisciplinary interest in the body and 
embodiment, and it is now a key topic of study and theorisation across the social sciences. In 
part this marks a shift in attention from the spoken and written communication to an interest in 
the range of ways in which people communicate, particularly within the context of complex 
digital environments. That said, debates around embodiment are not new, it has been 
discussed from the times of Plato, with previous peaks of interest notably in the early 1900’s. 
This review aims to provide an introduction to how embodiment is described within 
philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and computer science. In particular, we are 
concerned with approaches to embodiment within the context the contemporary digital 
landscape, and seek to sketch the key ideas and questions that ideas of embodiment raise 
with respect to digital environments and technologies. 
Theories of embodiment have a long and complex history. The initial ideas emerge from a 
philosophical tradition of inquiry into the nature of being and knowledge. Plato in The 
Republic (c.380 BC) discusses the immateriality of the soul – what we might today call the 
mind - and argues that this immateriality means that the soul (or mind) exists as an entity 
separate from the body, and therefore separate from reality (the here and now of your life). In 
other words the mind was perceived as having its own reality, because its existence was 
seen to continue after the death of the body. This idea that the mind was separate from the 
body was later dominant in the Christian metaphysical tradition in the form of a ‘soul’ 
(Anderson, 2003; Blattner, 2006). This idea of a mind-body split persisted into the 18th century 
through the works of Locke, Hume and Kant, notably in the latter’s The Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781). Here Kant argues that there can be no doubt that all knowledge begins with 
experience, and notes that thinking is ‘awakened’ by people’s interaction with objects, which 
then affect the senses. Thus, a dichotomy existed in that while earlier thinkers sought to only 
address the separation of mind and body, they also saw this separation as a necessity for 
understanding how the mind acquires ideas. Descartes (1641), for example, showed that 
trusting to perception alone to explain experience is limiting, as the senses can be deceived. 
For example, visual illusions clearly illustrate how vision can be deceiving. The mind, once 
freed from the restrictions that are placed upon the body1, such as physical laws like time or 
gravity, is then a place where study can be truly focused (Anderson, 2003). From this                                                         
1 Modern writers in this area argue that the body in fact is not limiting but freeing. For example activity 
via the body can free the mind, e.g. see the works of Sylvie Fortin and Helena Wulff on dance, 
expression and self-knowledge. Whilst this appears to be a return to the mind as a metaphysical object, 
and therefore a precursor to the mind/body problem again, this is more in the tradition of Heideggerian 
‘throwness’.  
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perspective, then, for people to learn and acquire knowledge, somehow this knowledge must 
be ‘translated’ from the physical experience to the mind.  
Yet the precise process and nature of this translation introduces an enduring conundrum 
across the social sciences. Mapping (or translation) is generally considered to be achieved 
through metaphor, and the form that this takes, or whether it occurs at all, is the subject of 
much debate. Indeed Artificial Intelligence (AI) works with this notion of translation and 
mapping, drawing on the work of philosophers to establish theories of mental abstraction and 
representation, which form an overarching theme of cognitivism. On the other hand, Lakoff 
and Johnson (philosopher and linguist) see the notion of metaphor through language as 
playing a significant role in how we express and conceptualise our world. For them the 
language we use is bounded and shaped by our physical experience, and subsequently 
influences the abstract ways in which we conceptualise the world. 
Thus, the separation of the body from mental abstraction is a problem, and many theorists 
argue that the two (body and mental abstraction) are not separate but part of a unified 
experience. This reunification of body, action, and mind is a key consideration in 
contemporary debates around embodiment.  At a high level we can trace the pathway of 
‘embodiment’ discussions from philosophical notions, which influenced the cognitivist 
traditions and views on embodiment. While cognitivism influenced AI, the subsequent 
pathways of development have differed with one pathway focusing more on evidence-based 
investigation, while the other generated theory driven explanations (see fig 1). Today’s 
terminology emerges from these developments, with most of the recent evidence for ‘the 
body influencing and mapping to the mind’ arising from the cognitive sciences, such as 
psychology and neuroscience. The meaning of terms used, though, is widely contested, 
causing variation in terminology, which often talks about similar concepts but in vastly 
different ways. 
 
Figure 1. The emergence of embodiment as a research area  
 
Thus, each discipline approaches ideas of embodiment from different initial starting points. 
While philosophers draw upon notions of embodiment found within Platonic and Aristotelian 
work, for computer scientists, embodiment derives primarily from Heidegger’s (1927) seminal 
exploration of the relationship between mind, body and knowledge in the early twentieth 
century. Inevitably, the question, audience, scope of the discussion and potential outcomes of 
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each discipline influences what is meant by the term ‘embodiment’.  These perspectives drive 
the disciplinary research agenda. 
This review seeks to sketch out a basic understanding of the embodiment debate with an eye 
toward its impact on research approaches to interaction with digital technology. In particular, 
we seek to understand the role of concepts of embodiment in the context of digital 
technology. The review begins by outlining three key lines of debate around embodiment from 
the perspectives of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, and sociology. These sections 
provide parallel notions of embodiment, each emphasising particular aspects within their own 
disciplines. The review then turns to Human Computer Interaction and Computer Science to 
try to get a handle on how concepts of embodiment have emerged within these disciplines, 
the key traditions they have drawn on, to derive a more contemporary idea of the role of 
embodiment within the context of digital technology interaction. Finally, the paper presents a 
discussion of the interrelationship between technology, embodiment and multiple disciplines. 
1. Embodiment from the philosophy tradition 
 
Philosophical approaches were the first to describe embodiment as purporting to the idea that 
humans are living, thinking, feeling beings that inhabit and interact with the physical world.  
The notion of embodiment within the philosophical discipline emerges primarily in the 
twentieth century as a reaction to logical positivism (or scientific reductionism) in the scientific 
community. The reductionist approach emphasised the Cartesian idea that mind and body 
were considered as separate elements. A reaction to positivism begins in earnest with 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), which builds on the work of Husserl (the principle 
founder of phenomenology) who set out to create a science of experience. Husserl was 
interested in explaining reality through a subjective interpretation of experience. Heidegger’s 
approach to understanding ‘being’ is therefore based on the subjective notion of experience 
and consciousness, rather than on a subjective view of the world as a set of objects and their 
relations with one another (Cartesian). Heidegger argues that as we inhabit the physical 
world, our experience within it is grounded in our actions. Our actions with tools and objects 
can change the nature of our relationship with the tool. For example, we can become so 
entrenched in activity with a particular tool (e.g. a pen when writing) that we often forget its 
existence. In this way it is seen to become ‘embodied’, to become part of you as a ‘master’ of 
that the tool. This has particular relevance today for thinking about embodiment in the context 
of ubiquitous digital technologies, such as sensor based and haptic technologies, because of 
their proposed ‘seamless use’ (Weiser, 1991). The properties of these technologies are 
considered to enable interaction with them to occur through everyday action and activity with 
the world, thus offering a ‘seamless’ connection between the digital and the physical. 
One effect of the apparent disappearance of materiality is that it can question the nature of 
our reality, as objects in the environment therefore begin to conjointly govern action within 
social, historical, psychological, and biological contexts.  In other words, objects (or tools) 
combined with human interaction can generate much more beyond the objects mere physical 
form. A pen, for example, is a small object, but with human use can generate other objects or 
texts far beyond its physical form. Most importantly for Heidegger though is the disruption that 
is caused when tools and objects that we employ fail in their use, and we are then faced with 
the bare reality of grounded existence in the flesh – the here and now. For Heidegger, the 
experience we have as individuals with specific objects, such as tools, creates mastery. As 
objects become tools, and we grow in our experience of them and attain mastery, our 
interaction with those objects changes. In this light, digital technology, in particular situations, 
such as in learning with science, would require keenly thought-out objects and tools that 
serve specific purposes, and make use of the capabilities of the body such as the hand allows 
grabbing, as Heidegger explicates in his discussion of a hammer.  
Merleau-Ponty (1945) takes up Heidegger’s ideas of mastery, disruption and use by 
foregrounding the body in all situations, rather than in certain situations such as mastery. 
Merleau-Ponty uses the notion of inter-coporeality to discuss ‘skilful coping’. In other words, 
the body inhabits the here and now, and experience a gestalt or experiential flow of a 
situation. For embodiment, Merleau-Ponty views the body as standing squarely in the middle 
of all interactions, reactions, and creation of understanding. Merleau-Ponty claims that for 
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perception the body must achieve flow - without thinking and rules - to get an optimal grip on 
the situation that the individual is placed within.  
Consciousness is a lived experience, where “to be a body is to be tied to a certain world…our 
body is not primarily in space: it is of it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 148). These ideas are 
continued in the work of Hilary Putnam (1994) and John McDowell (1998) who agree that the 
body and mind are nothing more than a “structured system of object involving abilities” 
(Putnam, 1994, p. 356). In other words: we learn and understand because we inhabit our 
bodies. For digital technology, this has meant a continued re-negotiation of the physical/digital 
divide. In human-computer interaction design the rise of mobile, tangible and haptic 
computing continues to blur the boundaries of the bodily interaction with digital information. 
For example, Tangible User Interfaces embed objects with digital information so that digital 
information can be directly manipulated and investigated, so-called embodied or tangible 
interaction (e.g. Dourish, 2001; Shaer & Hornecker, 2010).  
More recently, a radical move away from cognitivist approaches in philosophy and computer 
science is apparent in Lakoff and Johnson’s work (1999). Lakoff and Johnson suggest that 
communication and language show the extension of our experiences within our own body 
through the use of metaphor, which shapes our communication as well as the way that we 
think, act and perceive abstract concepts.  They distinguish between bodily metaphor and 
conceptual metaphor. Bodily metaphor refers to basic ideas that we learn as children. For 
example, the idea of containment is based on our own experience of using containers. We 
begin as children by placing objects in and out of containers, we learn that containers can 
hold items, and can be full or empty, and containers can be placed on surfaces. Lakoff and 
Johnson suggest that these ideas and concepts become more complicated over our lifespan, 
and move from being used in concrete contexts to enable expression of more abstract ideas. 
For example, “Social Interaction is Containment … He doesn’t fit in. She’s a square peg” 
(Lakoff, Espenson, Goldberg, & Schwartz, 1991, p. 21), or “OBLIGATIONS/AGREEMENTS 
ARE CONTAINERS….What obligations have you gotten yourself into? Can you get out of 
doing the dishes? There’s no way out; I have to do it.” (Lakoff, et al., 1991, p. 36). Conceptual 
metaphor then occurs at a more common level than we would believe, with speech showing 
the extension of our experiences within our own body and with the physical world. For 
thinking about embodiment with digital technology this means that that there are potentially 
certain verbal indicators that can highlight the physical experience of individuals. These can 
be used to either evaluate digital technology as they show deep level understanding of 
concepts, or can be used within design planning and assessment (e.g. Hurtienne et al., 
2010). Indeed, such metaphorical ideas form the basis of the design of many systems where 
mapping action to digital effects is central to interaction with the system (e.g. Price and 
Pontual Falcão, 2009; Antle, Corness, & Droumeva, 2009). 
In opposition to the Lakoff and Johnson approach, philosopher Andy Clark remains doubtful 
about this theory of embodiment, and argues - similarly to many of the criticisms aimed at 
Gibson's theory of ecological perception (see section 2) - that dynamic embodiment really 
only works in an extremely small number of cases.  For Clark words, for example, are nothing 
more than a form of environmental structuring rather than an information stream, as they are 
"cheap stand-ins for gross behavioural outcomes" (Clark, 2005, p. 234). In other words, 
language is something that sits at the tip of the iceberg, without revealing everything that has 
gone on underneath, in this case, the physical action that has taken place first. This is due to 
the fact that all attempts, according to Clark, to find action in all that we do, lie in the "key 
move in scaling up simple embodied cognitive science… to take very seriously the potent role 
of human-built structures in transforming the spaces of human learning and reason” (Clark, 
2005, p. 233). Here Clark is criticizing an approach where using theories and models to scale 
up to bigger contexts tends to reduce ideas to the level of neuroscience, removing all cultural 
and social influences. For example, a robot that can sweep one room does not necessarily 
scale up effectively to a bigger room. In contrast, in HCI investigations in the wild are 
considered important as lab-based interaction cannot show everything. However, to 
disengage interaction from reason ignores localised high-level reasoning, and so Clark 
argues that we need to be careful of complete adoption of embodiment without 
representational forms when they still exist in activities that may require planning. This 
suggests the need to argue for ‘mind’ going on at some level, which equates with Wilson’s 
(2002) idea of off-line cognition (see section 2).  
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Clark argues that examples of embodiment used in science are better thought of as 
"surrogate situations" of the perception-action-reason cycle, and offer a way into 
understanding whether embodiment exists all the way up to cognition.  
Examples of this surrogacy may be seen in notions of external cognition (Rogers & Scaife, 
1997) or even in tangible user interfaces, as they reveal how little we yet understand about 
the place of our bodies in cognition, but focus on man-made situations, which is where digital 
technology becomes useful.  
2. Psychology, Cognitive Science & Neuroscience 
This section draws collectively on psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience, as their 
discipline boundaries are not always clear, yet similar concepts are expressed with different 
emphases.  
Psychology  
Within psychology embodiment usually refers to how the body and its interactive processes, 
such as in perception or cultural acquisition through the senses, aid, enhance or interfere with 
the development of the human condition. From a developmental perspective, one tradition 
emerges from the works of Piaget (e.g. 1953; 1954) and argues that mental representations 
exist and so individuals experience embodied cognition. Theorists like Piaget understood the 
importance of bodily movement and experience for cognitive development, which are then 
amalgamated after the acquisition of an experience into a higher order form of representation 
that Piaget called ‘schema’ (Seitz, 2000). For example a child may experience the use of 
containers in all forms and gradually understand their use over time by interacting with and 
playing with different types of containers, and so build a mental picture of or ‘scheme’ about 
containers. Schemas are, therefore, formed within the mind while being supported by 
interaction with the environment. This is particularly relevant for thinking about embodiment 
with digital technologies as it provides a way to understand how experiences with digital 
technology may ‘map’ onto the mind. For example, mapping may occur on a variety of levels, 
highlighting important aspects of the learning experience for children such as space for 
action, perceptual, behavioural, and semantic mappings (Antle, 2007; Antle, Droumeva, & Ha, 
2009).  
Bruner’s The Course of Cognitive Growth (1964) stands as an early example of 
understanding the move from action in the environment to cognitive representation. Active 
cognitive load becomes externalized and supported, “[p]ast experience is coded and 
processed so that it may indeed be relevant and useable in the present when needed.” (1964, 
p. 2).  Development of cognitive representation for Bruner occurs through enactive, iconic and 
symbolic levels of representation, where: enactive is action-based, and primarily physical 
(e.g. for infants sitting, rolling, walking); iconic is image-based, as children begin to 
understand pictures and diagrams; and symbolic is language based (or a symbol system), as 
children begin to understand or work with abstract concepts. 
The engagement and classification of experience within the world then is so important for 
children that their, “understanding of object permanence and the developmental stage of their 
loco-motor ability” ultimately enables "[b]odily experience and sensori-motor interaction… to 
form the basis for meaning making” (Price, Roussos, Pontual Falcao, & Sheridan, 2009, p. 5). 
So much so that when coupling objects, representations and actions with meaning in the form 
of digital technology, the impact becomes significant on understanding and learning such that 
children "produce knowledge by expressing themselves through the representations they 
create [and] the artifact embodies the children’s activity and thoughts" (Marshall, Price, & 
Rogers, 2003; Price, et al., 2009, p. 11). 
In parallel with the Piagetian tradition, but adding an important layer to the theory of child 
development, Vygotsky’s (see 1962; 1978) socio-cultural approach argues that the 
community is vital for making meaning and for our understanding and interpretation of the 
world. Social learning for Vygotsky precedes formal development through a) culture, a tool 
which allows for adaptation b) social factors and c) the importance of language.  
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Whilst Vygotsky’s theory is not directly linked to the tradition of embodiment, it forms a strong 
basis for later theories of embodied interaction, which explain that interaction (for example the 
discussion of digital technology in the work of Lucy Suchmann) is better understood when 
placed within the [situated] cultural context.  
A rather different approach from Piaget and Vygotsky can be seen in Gibson’s Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception (1979), which follows from the Frankfurt school tradition of the 
Gestalt, arguing that objects which inhabit our environment offer themselves to us in the form 
in which they will be able to be used, here referred to as ‘affordances’. This idea postulates 
that the potentialities that an object offers are static and do not change according to the user, 
yet have a relationship with the user’s own physical form. For understanding the theory of 
embodiment Gibson’s notion grounds individual action within the here and now, and explains 
how we understand the world in terms of object interaction and perception. In Gibson’s words 
“Knowing is an extension of perceiving. The child becomes aware of the world by looking 
around and looking at, by listening, feeling, smelling, and tasting, but then she begins to be 
made aware of the world as well. She is shown things, and told things, and given models and 
pictures of things, and then instruments and tools and books, and finally rules and short cuts 
for finding out more things…They transmit to the next generation the tricks of the human 
trade. The labors of the first perceivers are spared their descendants” (1979, p. 258). 
Cognitive Science 
Theories of embodiment within cognitive science generally sit under the umbrella of 
‘embodied cognition’. Recent work on embodied cognition differs in its motivation for 
developing notions of embodiment. There is no longer a simple affordance/schema 
dichotomy, where the debate is over whether it is information from the environment or the 
storage mechanism that matters most, rather it is more about dynamic interaction, where 
cognition occurs in real time. However, there are a number of diverse foundations and 
descriptions that contribute to what is considered ‘embodied cognition’. Here we provide an 
illustration of the breadth of these, all of which speak to similar ideas, but with slightly different 
nuances. 
Lakoff and Johnson’s work (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) 
suggests that our way of reasoning (“the very structure of reasoning”) is derived from our 
bodily actions. Meaning and understanding are shaped by our experience of the particular 
physical form of our bodies (their constraints and potentials), and their everyday functioning 
or interaction with the world (see section 1 for more detail). 
Hutchins (1995) developed the ‘distributed cognition’ approach, which is grounded in 
ethnographical studies.   Here cognition, or cognitive phenomena, is viewed as being 
distributed across individuals, artefacts and internal and external representations. The 
motivation for this approach was to move away from traditional cognitive science approaches 
of information processing, and individual cognition, to place emphasis on human activity as a 
process that is equally dependent on other individuals and artefacts or tools, as their own 
cognitive activity. “Depending on their organization, groups must have cognitive properties 
that are not predictable from knowledge of the properties of the individuals in the group. The 
emphasis on finding and describing "knowledge structures" that are somewhere "inside" the 
individual encourages us to overlook the fact that human cognition is always situated in a 
complex sociocultural world and cannot be unaffected by it. …I have in mind the distinction 
between the laboratory, where cognition is studied in captivity, and the everyday world, where 
human cognition adapts to its natural surroundings. I hope to evoke with this metaphor a 
sense of an ecology of thinking in which human cognition interacts with an environment rich in 
organizing resources” (pp1-2). 
In contrast, Anderson’s (e.g. 2003) work originates in AI and robotics, yet makes somewhat 
similar claims, that “[R]eal-world thinking occurs in very particular (and often very complex) 
environments, is employed for very practical ends, and exploits the possibility of interaction 
with and manipulation of external props. It thereby foregrounds the fact that cognition is a 
highly embodied or situated activity —emphasis intentionally on all three—and suggests that 
thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings” (p.91). 
Drawing on both of these, we can see an emphasis on ‘human activity’ and the central role 
that this activity is thought to have in cognition.  
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Wilson (2002) draws on a variety of sources, including some of those above, to provide what 
she sees as “six [key] views” of embodied cognition: 
(i) Cognition is situated: i.e. cognition takes place in context, (and as such is influenced 
or shaped by that context), and is “on-line”, reacting to the moment, and is therefore without 
time for representation: 
(ii) Cognition is therefore also time pressured: there is no time for reflection as “realtime” 
occurrences are simply too fast, [in which case] 
(iii) Cognitive work is offloaded onto the environment: furthermore, due cognitive 
limitations such as memory, we use the environment to reduce cognitive work. For example, 
tying a knot in a handkerchief as a reminder, or using contemporary tools like mobile phones.  
(iv) The environment is part of the cognitive system: i.e. the flow of information between 
an individual and his environment makes it impossible to distinguish between the two, and 
any unit of analysis must consider both. 
(v) Cognition is for action: or in other words the mind’s function is to guide action, where 
the perception is intimately linked to subsequent ‘situation-appropriate’ behaviour. Thus, 
behaviour and environment are interdependent. 
(vi) Off-line cognition is body based: For Wilson this is the heart of embodied cognition, 
as all physical activity feeds into on-line cognition at some level. “Decoupled from the physical 
inputs and outputs that were their original purpose…assist in thinking and knowing…the 
function of these sensorimotor resources is to run a simulation of some aspect of the physical 
world, as a means of representing information or drawing inferences” (Wilson, 2002, p633). 
We end this section with a quote from Rohrer (2006), who offers a comprehensive overview 
of ‘embodied cognitive science’ drawing on key cognitive science perspectives (Rohrer, 
2006).  This quote eloquently describes our common propensity to move in and out of our 
own bodily awareness, and which highlights a key dichotomy in discussions of embodiment. 
“Human beings have bodies. Academics of every variety, so often caught up in the life of the 
mind, find that simple truth altogether too easy to forget. Imagine working late into the night, 
hotly pursuing another bit of perfect prose. But now let there be a power outage and, in the 
absence of electric light or the pale glow of the computer screen, imagine how we grope and 
fumble to find our briefcase, locate the door, and exit the building. In such circumstances, the 
body returns. Whenever we are unexpectedly forced to move about in the dark, we are 
forcibly reacquainted with our bodily sense of space. Problems ordinarily solved beneath the 
level of our conscious awareness become dominant in our cognition; we find ourselves 
noticing subtle changes in the floor texture underfoot, carefully reaching out for the next step 
in the stairwell. It is a most peculiar experience, one that may well remind us of being young 
and just learning to walk down stairs” (pp1-2). 
Neuroscience  
In parallel, work within neuroscience suggests that motor activity is the basis of thought, in 
effect our physical actions directly link to our thought processes and so “we think kinesically 
too” (Seitz, 2000, p. 24 ). Neuroscience increasingly gives much of the workable data that 
backs up cognitive theories of embodiment. In neuroscience the discovery of canonical and 
mirror neurons strongly grounds the theory of embodiment strong in brain structure. Both 
types of neuron are equipped with motor and visual properties, and fire during tasks that 
involve action, or (and most importantly) the observation of action. The firing of the neuron 
occurs as if the observer were actually carrying out the act itself.  Mirror neurons are 
implicated more in the transitive hand movements such as grasping, holding, releasing, 
manipulating and releasing. Accompanying sounds that go along with a particular action are 
enough to make mirror neurons fire in the same way. Conversely, canonical neurons are tied 
up with the visual perception of objects. Whilst an object’s characteristics such as shape, 
size, and orientation are important, they only occur and impact upon the observer when an 
action is executed upon it (Garbarini, 2004). This highlights the close bodily relationship with 
perceptual functioning. 
Current research has moved beyond a focus on neuronal links to try to understand their 
interactive relationship with the body. For example, by exploring the neuronal activity 
triggered by functional tasks or activities, suggests the level and distribution of neuronal 
activity in a more dynamic fashion. Research indicates that more than one area of neuronal 
activity is triggered highlighting the complexity of the interaction.  
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‘Body Schema’ or ‘forward’ flow models have thus been developed to seek to understand the 
sensory-motor representation of an agent’s body by looking at possibilities for action (e.g. De 
Preester & Knockaert, 2005). Forward predictor models explain how agents are capable of 
predicting, acting on, and anticipating behaviour. This may be through feedback in the form of 
locomotion (which may be body movement or locomotion in a robot). Neuroscience here has 
some overlap with AI as the notion of forward planning, and prediction has plagued AI, with 
only very recent research projects being able to address these issues. Foremost of these is 
the iCub project (Metta et al., 2008) which addresses the issue of ‘emergence’, or how it is 
that intelligent action emerges from perception that is housed within a body, and how this 
knowledge can be transferred to artificially intelligent machines, so that they can predict and 
plan in unfamiliar environments (Anderson, 2003).  
3. Sociology 
Sociology critically reflects on how the body is drawn into (and made through) embodied 
interactions, regulation, control and identities. Primarily the body is seen as being actively 
shaped and “subjectively embodied in a fluid, emergent, and negotiated process of being” 
(Waskul and Vannini, 2006). For Waskul and Vannini (2006) there are five areas of bodily 
discussion: 
The ‘Looking Glass’ Body  
The idea of the ‘looking glass’ body is influenced by the works of the American Pragmatists, 
and in particular Charles Horton Cooley, where the self and the body can only be formed from 
the imaginary perspective of others. Charles Goodwin in ‘Action and embodiment within 
situated human interaction’ (2000) argues that the construction of action is an ever-unfolding 
semiotic field. Social processes are to be found within the ‘historically shaped material world’. 
For digital technology this means that multiple sign systems exist, present with power 
structures, social structural arrangements, participation frameworks and orientation issues 
“made by actors’ bodies” (Goodwin, 2000 p. 1492). This is particularly the case as 
experiences of people on social networking sites show with facebook, twitter, and second life, 
placing a wall of meaning between the actor and the reader. This increase of online identity 
with a parallel increase in presentation, means that for some observers there is an easy 
increase in contact, e.g. through facebook, but it also means that it is equally easy to avoid 
contact (Turkle, 2009, 2011). New forms of ‘online’ contact create new forms of cyberculture, 
and cybersubjectivity (Sundén, 2003). Online encounters are thus seen as new ways in which 
the individual is embodied, and may even be engendered, with feminist interpretations 
offering the only salient interpretation (i.e. the emphasis is on the subjective interpretation of 
meaning) (Sundén, 2003). Overall, technological "boundaries, in a physical and social sense, 
are examples of embodiment and presence, e.g. the sense of someone else (through the 
avatars) being in "your‟ space." (Price, et al., 2009, p. 13). Digital bodies can therefore be 
used to interact in multiple ways such as greeting, playing, or conveying opinions or feelings 
(Price, et al., 2009). 
Dramaturgy 
The concept of ‘dramaturgy’ is influenced by Erving Goffman, where the body is perceived as 
being embedded in social practices, and “people actively do a body”. For Goffman (1959) 
identity is created anew by individuals, depending on their circumstance, image, or desired 
image portrayal. It can thus change from context to context. Furthermore, Goffman argues 
that we all seek to influence our social setting through the use of actions, props, and the 
places we choose to stage ourselves within. In this sense identity is replaced with character, 
and becomes a more loosely manifested social construct that rather ebbs and flows with time, 
but only within certain places such as institutions and buildings.  
Judith Butler (1990) is concerned more closely with issues of identity creation with respect to 
gender. For Butler we are embodied with a sense of who we are through the impact and 
exposure to entrenched and engendered stereotypes. The creation of the feminine or the 
masculine occurs over time and hence we become ‘male’ or a ‘female’ over time, and in fact 
never fully reach the gendered destination that society imposes upon us. The embodied 
identity that society imposes Butler describes as inevitably a failure, which is a positive 
starting point from which the individual can embark upon the journey of gender creation. 
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Ultimately, as varying social restrictions are placed upon people who depart from the created 
set of gender norms, the individual’s “experience of a gendered... cultural identity is 
considered an achievement” (Butler, 1990).  
Phenomenology  
This perspective influenced by Edmund Husserl, perceives the body as ‘embodied’, but only 
in clear and situational circumstances. In other words, the body is “embedded in our 
experiences within the world”, and in terms of the environment(s) that it creates. The 
embodied habits, or habitus, that people use, or develop, are discussed by Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) and later by Pierre Bourdieu (1984). For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological body 
has a somatic presence, that is, that the self, society and symbolic order are all found 
“through the work of the body” (Waskul and Vannini, 2006). The body: 
“[S]erves as a fundamental corporeal anchor in the world; we… experience ourselves through 
numerous “bodies of meaning”. These “bodies of meaning” are both literal and metaphorical: 
meaning is comprised in embodied action and the body is interpreted by frameworks of 
meaning” (Waskul and Vannini, 2006, p9). 
Examples of the impact of habitus are found in the works of Helena Wulff (1998), 
Wainwright’s (2006), and Sylvie Fortin (2002), who seek to show that stylized and formulaic 
methods of dance found in ballet create types of people, institutions, and even working 
practices in the form of choreography. For Fortin the somatic (i.e. ‘of the body’ as opposed to 
‘of the mind’) practice, which is dance is the search for the ‘elusive obvious’, where “truth is 
linked to…experience and as such…voices a construction of reality” (Fortin, 2002). Here the 
emphasis is on the act of doing something in constructing ‘reality’, your physical action is the 
only thing you can rely on in terms of experience, which must therefore be ‘reality’. The 
embodiment of styles in schools of ballet encapsulates the essence of the ballerina or 
danseur noble but also inhibits movement between types. The trajectory of the somatic 
element to embodiment in fact begins to pursue the mind-body split again as “the body is 
perceived from within by first person perception…The soma, being internally perceived, is 
categorically distinct from a body…Dance teachers must be alert to see how dualism is 
conveyed in their practice” (Fortin, 2002). Ultimately the body is transformational; the self 
should be seen as a process, a ‘selfing’ rather than a clearly defined object (Fortin, 2002). For 
digital technology this means that embodied action through digital technology such as with 
the Playstation dance dance revolution or Kinect dance create not only a games but feedback 
in the form of onscreen mirroring of action, and so create habits and cultures around the 
technology. Game situations then provide new and different frameworks of meaning for self –
expression, where the soma is no longer viewed – as would be the case in a dance studio - in 
a mirror, but mirrored back in imitation (e.g. Jenson & de Castell, 2009).  
The Socio-Semiotic perspective  
The socio-semiotic perspective on the body is influenced by the work of Michael Foucault 
(e.g. 1978), where bodies disappear under culture and discourse, and embodied interaction 
occurs through meaning-making, which is dictated by power relations. Individuals, for 
example, are subsumed or consumed within institutions, groups or media. As a result the 
body becomes an object and a sign-vehicle. The body becomes an area for physical capital. 
The body becomes a situated entity that is influenced and manipulated by surrounding 
society. In the medical sociological of Dawn Goodwin, the body is assessed through its place 
within the surgical theatre. Goodwin (2008) argues that the anaesthetised patient becomes 
heavily reliant on machines, and in a sense becomes a ‘mix of organic and technological 
components, in other words, a cyborg” (Goodwin, 2008, p346). The person, for Goodwin, 
becomes silenced and rendered passive, or depersonalised by health care practices. The 
body becomes a “living cadaver”. In this sense the body becomes a challenge to our 
understandings of society, our own body, and the mechanisms of health care. The patient 
becomes a “passive object of knowledge”, where the transformational processes and 
relations between humans and artefacts become “folded” into one another. Thus challenges 
around ideas of embodiment are created with digital technologies where the digital 
technology becomes part of the body, and the boundaries between are merged.  
However, if the idea of the body is removed from the discussion about the uses of technology 
and how it interacts with humans, the interaction element is now different and digital 
technology is left with ‘context’.  
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Here Suchman (Suchman, 2007) argues within the Vygotskian tradition that “situation is 
crucial to [an] action’s interpretation” (p.176). The “contingency of action on a complex world 
of objects, artifacts, and other actors, located in space and time, is no longer treated as an 
extraneous problem with which the individual actor must contend, but rather is seen as the 
essential resource that makes knowledge possible and gives action its sense” (p.177). 
Embodiment then in this sense bypasses the body altogether and so frames embodied action 
within a system of meaning, proposing that situations create context-oriented action. 
However, Donna Haraway (1988) warns that the so-called objectivity in all scientific 
endeavor, such as concepts of embodiment in digital technology, is a “contestable text”, and 
a “power field”. Here “artifacts and facts are parts of the powerful art of rhetoric” (Haraway, 
1988, p. 577). Technology as part of that rhetoric whilst semiotic and open to a variety of 
ways to make meaning is present in the “irreducible difference and radical multiplicity of local 
knowledges” (p579). However, Haraway (1988) warns that visualization, as occurs in on-line 
interaction y has led to “compounded…meanings of disembodiment” (p. 581). For example, 
with social networks disembodiment is compounded through the likelihood of not seeing 
another person. This theory of feminist embodiment “is not about fixed location in a reified 
body, female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections of orientations, and 
responsibility for difference in material semiotic fields of meaning (Haraway, 1988, p. 588)”. 
The body becomes an agent, “not a resource” where “boundaries materialize in social 
interaction (pp. 594-595).” 
The Narrative Body  
The narrative body viewpoint contends that the person is a narrative accomplishment. The 
individual is made sense of through the stories and narratives we create and tell others and 
ourselves. For example consultation in the doctor’s surgery reveals how individuals embody 
their lived and ill experience on a small-scale during consultation using gesture to indicate 
places of agreement and pain (Heath, 2002). This ‘intercorporeal knowing’ places the body 
back at the centre of action, where trajectories of action take centre stage alongside talk 
(Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007). In the context of technology and learning interaction, a 
sociological perspective could mean consideration or awareness, of how different people 
interact with and use technology to take on different roles within groups to ‘play out’ ideas. 
Technology can for example – even in small doses – offer a variant interpretation to the co-
ordinated action of others, making action visible that would otherwise not be seen (e.g. Heath, 
Hindmarsh, & Luff, 1999). Individual differences in interaction may be explored through the 
notion of dramaturgy or ‘performance’ with digital technologies like tangibles or sensor based 
devices or mobile technologies – where ‘performance’ through action on objects or devices is 
central to the interaction. In medical situations interaction with technology is nothing new in 
itself, but it is with the interpretation of bodily interaction in and around technology, particularly 
in the medical workplace. Here the suggestion is that technology embedded or embodied in a 
human changes the nature of the ‘body’ and the interaction with it – it is no longer purely 
human but has features of a cyborg. In this context technology is invasive rather than siting 
external to the body like technologies such as tangibles where the relationship between 
technology and ‘body’, and the notion of embodiment differs. 
4. Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) & Computer Science 
The question of embodiment has re-emerged within the context of HCI, particularly with new 
forms of interaction reaching the marketplace through systems such as the Nintendo Wii, the 
Xbox Kinect, multi-touch tables, and touch interaction technology of the iPad/I Phone/iPod 
Touch. These digital technologies have created new controllers, and new forms of play 
(Jenson and Castell, 2009), as well as the potential for other, new, forms of interaction. With 
new types of interaction, “play is very much situated within a broader network of actions, 
actors and activities which are community-based and supported (Jenson and Castell, 2009, 
p1.)” The resulting relationship between actors highlights inter-dependencies, interactions and 
support networks that grow and occur as a result of new forms of interaction (Latour, 2005). 
Jenson and Castell (2009) argue that previous forms of technology produced an experience 
of simulation, whereas now the emphasis has moved toward imitation, which for the authors 
means that where action is “just like it” as opposed to weak simulated copy. This echoes 
ideas found within the embodiment debate as imitation models reality in physical interaction.  
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Computer scientists began by drawing on computational models of the mind, initially focusing 
on ideas around symbolic representations of real-life occurrences, called ‘mental 
representations’, a lineage going back as far as Hume, Locke and Berkeley as discussed 
earlier in this paper. Mental abstraction in representation, for cognitivists is disassociated from 
real things. Anderson for example argues that: “To some degree, of course, such formal 
abstraction is a necessary condition for representation – the token for ‘green’ in my mental 
lexicon is not itself green, nor does it necessarily share any of the other properties of green. 
Indeed the relation between sign and signifier seems in this sense necessarily arbitrary” 
(Anderson, 2003, p93). From the perspective of cognitivists, the context of an object becomes 
unimportant, as the primary focus on formal rules and logic that evolved from attempts to 
establish computer languages in artificial intelligence – to reflect mental abstraction- and 
evolved into a key goal in AI (Dreyfus, 1972, 1992).  Early works in artificial intelligence also 
sought to make computer parallels with the human mind. These early symbolic 
representations in AI have on the whole been unsuccessful according to criticism of the 
cognitivist approach by Hubert Dreyfus (e.g. in What Computers Still Can’t Do, 1992). Dreyfus 
argues that mental representations of the world formed the basis of languages of symbolic 
representation in computing, but AI and cognitivism fails as the dynamic interrelationship with 
the world that humans experience, especially in subtlety through, for example, eyes (gaze) 
and gesture, embodied interaction cannot currently be replicated in this way. Simply put 
Dreyfus believes that mental representation does not work without the body placed in context. 
Furthermore, AI has problems in the “twin scale-up of environmental richness and real-time 
dynamics [which] has so far proved insurmountable” (Anderson, 2003, p97). The issue here is 
that an AI system has not only to perceive or sense what it is in the environment, but has to 
interpret its meaning. A further problem has been in the area of planning for AI systems, “that 
of figuring out what to do next, given, say, a certain goal and a current situation” (Anderson, 
2003, p97). Dreyfus believes that computer science and AI will never have the answer to 
mirroring the human mind, even though ‘emergence’ and the use of non-symbolic modeling is 
beginning to show that computers can learn context and environments that they are 
unfamiliar with (Anderson, 2003).   
Approaches to embodiment in computer science then emerge from a critique of the cognitivist 
tradition with Winograd and Flores’ (1986), who return to the work of Heidegger to develop 
the idea of ‘ready to hand’, and ‘present at hand’ as part of the human condition (dasein). 
Heidegger suggests that whilst objects may exist in our environment – present at hand – 
when they are used and fulfill their function well they become a part of the user and become 
ready-to-hand (Dourish, 2001; Marshall, et al., 2003). In other words, as an object, especially 
a tool becomes a part of the body through action it thus ‘disappears’ from consciousness or 
focus of attention. Tools with tangible qualities only become revealed again (or present-at-
hand) when the tool or object breaks (Heidegger, 1923), and the focus of the tool itself is 
foregrounded, rather than the action with it.  
Heidegger focuses on the importance of mastery in interaction and of practical wisdom, or 
when an individual is acting in the right place, at the right time with the right experience 
(Dreyfus, 1991). The resulting practical wisdom of being ‘thrown’ into and grounded in reality 
can result in an ability to change the perception of others. This idea of Heidgger’s was 
elaborated upon in the works of Merleau-Ponty who moves the discussion to the body (see 
section one on philosophical notions of embodiment). Here Merleau-Ponty looks at ‘skilful 
coping’, and explains the body in terms of the gestalt of a situation that an individual finds 
themselves placed within. Examples of this are to be found in the sociological literature (e.g. 
Fortin, 2002). 
These approaches are explicitly manifested within the practical application of computer 
science. The idea of ‘disappearing tools’ forms the backdrop to ‘ubiquitous computing’ 
(Weiser, 1991). Weiser’s ideas expanded here i.e. computing as a tool. The ‘skilful coping’ 
and ‘mastery’ approaches echo the importance of context put forward by thinkers such as 
Vygotsky (see section two on Psychology). Context-oriented action is often additionally 
coupled with the manipulation of external props (Anderson, 2003), the importance of which 
are developed further in Dourish’s theory of ‘embodied interaction’ (2001). Dourish argues 
that historically computing became divorced from real interaction in the environment with the 
evolution of traditional desktop computing. He proposed that we should exploit our interaction 
with the everyday world, and our familiarity with objects as the “world of social interaction and 
physical artifact is the place computer technology should be inhabiting” (Dourish, 2001, p.17). 
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Dourish explains that phenomenologically, the use of multi-sensory artifacts enhanced or 
embedded with digital technology makes more sense than mere desktop computers 
especially when placed in particular cultures, times, or environments.  
Tangible User Interfaces offer one explicit way where embodiment might be exploited through 
digital technology. Marshall, et al. (2003, echoing Heidegger, 1927) argue that tangible user 
interfaces embed digital technology in artifacts allowing for two types of tangibles: expressive 
and exploratory. Expressive tangibles focus on the present-at-hand and on external 
representation of activity, whereas in exploratory interaction tangibles provide a ‘ready at 
hand’ kind of interaction where the tangible is used to ‘explore’ a model that someone else 
has created, either by practical manipulation or theoretical reflection. Other work in the 
context of tangible interfaces goes so far as to suggest that children ‘think with the hands’, 
especially to simplify problem solving tasks (Antle, Droumeva, et al., 2009) e.g. physically 
turning jig-saw pieces to see where their shape fits into the puzzle. This is an example of 
using ‘epistemic action’ (Kirsch and Maglio, 1994), that is, action that changes the 
environment to reduce cognitive work (also see Wilson, section 2). Action based learning in 
this way with digital technologies such as tangible user interfaces provide the opportunity for 
potentially powerful learning experiences in context and with particular users in mind (Antle, 
2007).  
Gesture is also considered an extensive and important aspect that supports observable 
discussion and explanation (e.g. Goldin-Meadow, 1999). Manipulation of objects is seen as a 
gestural precursor, where physical arrangement, participants, and artifacts provide the 
support necessary to achieve communicative competence (Roth, 2002). Tangible interfaces 
offer such manipulative /gestural activity with artefacts, potentially fostering effective 
communicative ability. In HCI, gesture has also been used to make experiences more 
seamless. Instrumental and empathic gestures (i.e. gestures that do something like pointing 
at an object as opposed to showing surprise by placing the hand over ones mouth) have 
found that technological experiences that are high in gesture, are equally high in social 
interaction (Lindley, Le Couteur, & Bianchi-Berthouze, 2008) More recently, gesture has been 
used as an indicator of quality of experience with multi-touch interaction (Hurtienne, et al., 
2010).  Gestures are now being explored not only in the 2D touch dimension but in the 3D 
'free form' type which can occur with a MS Kinect system (Hurtienne, et al., 2010). 
As active exploration, in contexts like tangible interfaces, extends sensitivity in haptic 
feedback, tangibles offer a hands-on way of extending our perception (Hoggan, forthcoming). 
Haptic interfaces offer an important and powerful tool for interaction, as they usually exist 
multi-modally, using visual, auditory and haptic feedback. Tactile feedback in particular has 
been found to be better when used passively or actively for "alerts and structured feedback" 
(Hoggan, forthcoming, p.15). The “skin is often less engaged in other tasks than the eyes or 
ears, and [so] it is always ready to receive information (Hoggan, forthcoming, p.3)." In 
contrast, kinesthetic perception refers to sensations that arise from muscles and tendons in 
real space and are at the mercy of force, position and velocity. Kinesthetic feedback is useful 
for active interaction with objects as our own awareness of our limbs placement in space 
ranges only from 20-30Hz, as opposed to tactile perception of frequencies that can be 
anything from 10-250Hz (Hoggan, forthcoming). This makes it understandable as to why the 
iPhone and touch screen technology has become more advanced than interactive gaming 
equipment, which, whilst popular, has not had as much immediate impact on the 
technological market. Haptic technology is still relatively new, and as result most haptic 
feedback only offers low resolution for quantitative information. However, haptic interfaces 
can create the physical sensation of pressing a button, holding a ball or even completely new 
touch sensations (Hoggan, forthcoming).  
Kinesthetic interaction with digital technology has led to exciting ways in which whole-body 
interaction may be invaluable. For example, where concepts are otherwise hard to engage 
with, such as tonal harmony, whole body interaction can enable learning to occur particularly 
by applying the theory of conceptual metaphor, discussed in section one (Holland, Wilkie, 
Bouwer, M., & Mulholland, 2011). Holland et al. (2011) used Dalcroze Eurhythmics to show 
how simply hearing examples of tonal harmony was not sufficient for understanding. 
Rhythmic gymnastics and movement were integrated into a game 'Harmony Space so 
that different musical pieces through movement places harmony, pitch, scale, key, chord 
function, root and bass line onto a visual plotting device.  
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Whole body interaction also allows interactional mappings between "input actions and output 
responses” (Antle, Corness, & Droumeva, 2009). For example, in their SoundMaker 
environment, musical concepts such as tempo, volume and pitch were mapped to movement 
in terms of the speed, proximity and flow of movement. This relationship between conceptual 
metaphor and whole body interaction was also explored in Springboard (Antle, Corness, et 
al., 2009), where children physically engaged with a balance board to explore notions of 
social justice. Here ideas following three themes of agricultural production, health and 
nutrition and culinary aesthetics to explore balance are related to three images displayed on a 
screen. As participants moved on the balance board the image and sound were triggered to 
display representations that approximated the users' understanding of social justice. 
Tactile interaction in mobile systems, coupled with context-aware systems are now found in 
the Android, iPhone, and other mobile platforms. The world in mobile form therefore takes a 
step closer to becoming the interface, and enables computer supported work with sensors 
embedded in the physical environment (e.g. Weiser, 1991; Price and Winters, 2005). 
Applications such as Layar, ARCGis, Google Earth, and learning prototypes such as the 
mobile application GeoSciTeach place the individual at the heart of geographical interaction 
(Haklay, 2010). Here embodiment extends the reach of the individual to being part of a larger 
environment, making individuals context aware through information presentation and overlay. 
Applications such as Layar, overlay information on top of what is already present in the 
immediate (or remote) environment. Space is then calculated according to co-ordinates, 
distance or the ability to extrapolate and interpolate information (Haklay, 2010). The extent to 
which the interface alters with mobile technology enables physical and social location to be 
impacted upon, and this can affect learning task as well as the extent of collaboration taking 
place (Price and Winters, 2005). In this respect context itself becomes content (Price and 
Winters, 2005).  
Conclusion 
What does this mean for research in digital environments, and of particular interest within the 
MODE project, the research methods for exploring digital learning environments? Some key 
themes that emerge, and which can form the basis for empirical work, include: action, gesture 
and physical engagement; context and situated-ness; environment-interaction-cognition 
relationship; and metaphor-based interaction, particularly with respect to digital-physical 
mappings for both physical and conceptual interaction. Each of these themes are important in 
shaping research directions to gain insight into the role of ‘embodiment’ in technology 
learning environments, and raise questions such as, 
 
What does embodied learning look like and what kinds of embodied learning do people 
experience? 
How do digital technologies enable or shape ‘experience’ and to what extent – if any - are 
these then ‘embodied’ experiences?  
Do context-aware mobile applications support more ‘embodied’ interaction with the 
environment? What forms of embodiment do tangible technologies or sensor technologies 
foster, and what is their role in learning?  
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